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was not a case that properly could be resolved by summary judg-
ment . 
B. FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY THE DEVELOPERS. 
One of the most important disputed factual issues 
raised by the Developers' own brief was when they learned of 
the pipeline, either personally, or through their agents 
authorized to develop the property.-7 While the Developers 
claim that they didn't personally learn of the pipeline until 
February, 1983, Stephen Keil, their partner, knew of it in 
September, 1979. See, Tr. 229-232, 235, 256, 264, 330-333; 
Keil Deposition, R. 1412, pp. 15, 22. The engineers that the 
Developers hired to plan the development of the property also 
knew of the pipeline before the December, 1979 sale by the 
Combes. See, Addendum A to the Combes' opening brief. 
From the beginning, these engineers configured the 
plan drawings around the pipeline, which they accurately 
assumed to include a 30 foot wide easement. See, Tr. 249-264. 
The disclosure of the easement in the real estate contract 
would have told the Developers and their engineers no more 
about the potential development problems than they already knew 
±/
 The Developers' allegations that the Combes knew 
of the pipeline prior to the sale to the Developers are also 
disputed, and no such finding was ever made by the district 
court. See, n. 5, infra. 
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at the time. If the Developers' agents did not in fact inform 
the Developers of the pipeline, then the Developers' claim is 
against their agents, not the Combes. 
The Developers admit personal knowledge of the pipe-
line as of February, 1983. This raises other inherently fac-
tual issues not addressed by the trial court. Did the Devel-
opers wait an unreasonable amount of time (18 months) before 
asserting their rescission claims? Were their words and 
actions, or those of their agents, during this period, incon-
sistent with rescission? 
The Developers mischaracterize their post-February, 
1983 conduct as "settlement negotiations." Since even they 
admit they believed that their claims were against Froerer 
rather than the Combes, there was nothing to "settle" with the 
Combes. See, Breuer-Harrison brief at p. 6. 
Instead, the Developers affirmed the real estate 
contract by, among other things, executing two amendments in 
1984. Thus, the real reason the Developers decided to back out 
of the contract later in 1984 was not the pipeline, which had 
been taken into account all along, but rapidly falling real 
estate prices. What had seemed like a good business deal for 
the Developers in 1979 and 1980 had become a bad deal for them 
by late 1984, for reasons having nothing to do with the pipe-
line or easement. 
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Rescission is an equitable remedy that required reso-
lution of all of the above factual issues, and the District 
Court erred in awarding this remedy by summary judgment. 
C. FACTUAL ISSUES RAISED BY FROERER AND ATGF. 
The main factual issue raised by Froerer is the iden-
tity of his clients. Although Froerer gave self-serving testi-
mony that he believed his client was Keil, one of the Devel-
opers' partners, Froerer's belief is not the issue. Froerer 
gave the Combes reason to believe he was protecting their 
interests. Not only did Froerer prepare the contract between 
the Combes and the Developers (as well as the earlier drafts 
and the later amendments), he prepared the property transfer 
documents between Keith and Clair Combe and their siblings, to 
which the Developers were not parties. See, Froerer Deposi-
tion, R. 1418, pp. 6-8, 19-20, 48, 55-56; Deposition of Combe, 
R. 1411, pp. 25-29. The legal work for both transactions was 
paid for solely by the Combes. 
Any confusion in Keith Combe's mind about Froerer's 
role in the transaction was created by Froerer himself, who 
breached his duties to Combe to fully disclose what that role 
was, and to advise Combe if, despite all appearances to the 
contrary, he was not protecting Combe's interests. It was 
Froerer that Combe paid to draft all of the above contracts, 
not Paul Kunz. 
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The other factual issue raised by both Froerer and 
ATGF is whether the Combes relied upon him or his admittedly 
negligent title work done as ATGF' s agent. As pointed out in 
the Combes opening brief, Froerer and ATGF assert that their 
negligence in failing to do the title work on time is a defense 
to their negligence in failing to do the work properly. How-
ever, the Combes relied upon Froerer as their attorney, and 
upon ATGF as the party with whom they contracted for the work, 
to advise them prior to closing if the title work had not been 
done. 
Froerer and ATGF were paid for that work at closing, 
and the real estate contract Froerer drafted on the Combes* 
behalf also required the title policy at closing (See, para-
graph 8 of the contract, a copy of which is attached as Adden-
dum B to the Combes' opening brief). Were the Combes to assume 
that Froerer had not performed the york, even though he had 
already paid himself, and the documents he drafted required the 
work to be performed before closing? Froerer's silence could 
only be interpreted to mean he had done the title work he 
agreed to do, that there were no title defects, and that he had 
furnished the title policy to the Developers. 
Although Froerer paid himself out of his own escrow 
account in January, 1980, the title policy was not issued by 
Froerer until November, 1980. Froerer knew at the time he 
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received payment that he had not completed the title work he 
had agreed to do, both individually and as ATGF's authorized 
agent. However, he failed to advise the Combes of this. 
Because the title policy was to be furnished at or 
prior to closing, its purpose was the same as a preliminary 
title report or abstract of title. If the title work had been 
done properly and on time, none of the resulting damages to the 
Combes would have occurred. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
I. 
THE DEVELOPERS COULD NOT WAIT INDEFINITELY 
BEFORE ASSERTING THEIR RESCISSION CLAIMS. 
The central theme of the Developers' legal arguments 
is that even if they were aware of the pipeline and easement 
prior to acquiring the property, they could never waive or be 
estopped from asserting rescission claims, no matter how long 
they waited. This argument is outlandish. Their supporting 
analysis of the case law on "anticipatory breach," and of the 
distinction between "executory" and "executed" contracts is 
faulty and contrary to the general legal principles governing 
rescission of all types of contracts. 
The best example of this is the Developers' reliance 
on Hurvitz v. David K. Richards Co., 20 Utah 2d 232, 436 P. 2d 
794 (Utah, 1964). While the Developers are correct that under 
the Hurvitz line of cases a party generally can bring a damage 
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claim either (1) at the time of the anticipatory breach or (2) 
at the time performance is due, this does not apply if the 
party chooses the third option available, rescission. Under 
Hurvitz, a party cannot continue "to recognize the contract so 
long as it is profitable" to do so, and then rescind when the 
contract becomes no longer profitable, 436 P.2d at 796. More-
over, even the damage claim for an anticipatory breach may be 
waived, where as here, the party's delay in bringing the claim 
constitutes a failure to mitigate the alleged damages. See, 
University Club v. Invesco-Holdinq Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 
P. 2d 29 (1972) as quoted on p. 18 of the Breuer-Harrison brief. 
One reason why, in some instances, courts allow a 
party to wait before bringing a damage claim for anticipatory 
breach, is because the breaching party may be able to cure the 
breach before the time for performance is due. Similarly, the 
rationale behind the other line of cases relied upon by the 
Developers, holding that there is no waiver from delay in 
asserting certain types of title defects, is that these defects 
generally are curable. 
Here, the district court correctly determined that the 
existence of the pipeline could not be "cured." However, the 
court erred in relying on the anticipatory breach and nonwaiver 
of title defect cases as justifying the Developers' waiver of 
rescission. The pipeline (even with the accompanying easement) 
-7-
was not so much a title problem, as it was, according to the 
Developers' allegations, a physical problem with the property. 
Because the pipeline was unalterable, as the Developers knew, 
there was simply no basis, either as a matter of legal reason-
ing, or plain common sense, to allow them to sit on their 
rights (to the Combes' detriment). 
For similar reasons, the distinction the Developers 
attempt to draw between waivers of rescission claims in 
"executory" and "executed" contracts makes no sense as applied 
to the facts of this case. Obviously, an "anticipatory" breach 
can only occur in an executory contract. Here, however, the 
Combes could no more remove the government pipeline at the time 
the Developers claim they discovered it, than they could at 
some time in the future when delivery of deeds was due. The 
"executory" contract became no different than one on whch 
performance had become due, the minute the Developers discov-
ered the pipeline. At that point, they had to make an elec-
tion, which they did by affirming the contract. 
The Developers' agents were aware of the pipeline 
before the Developers agreed to purchase the property, and were 
aware that the pipeline would always be there (as opposed to 
the mortgages and other types of "curable" title defects 
typically found in the non-waiver cases cited by the Devel-
opers). Thus, it must be presumed that the Developers 
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agreed to the pipeline as well. Similarly, in executing two 
amendments expressly affirming the contract after they admit 
they had personal knowledge of the pipeline, the Developers 
also affirmed their agreement to the pipeline. See, Addendum C 
to the Combes' opening brief. 
Any other analysis would turn the law of rescission on 
its ear. The equitable principles upon which rescission is 
based bar unreasonably delayed rescission claims on "executory" 
as well as executed contracts. These principles must also be 
applied to bar the Developers' rescission claims here. 
II. 
FROERER'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST DID NOT RELIEVE 
HIM OF HIS DUTIES TO THE COMBES AS HIS CLIENTS. 
Froerer's argument that the conflict of interest he 
created eliminated his duties to one of his conflicting groups 
of clients, the Combes, is simply incredible. The Combes were 
victimized because Froerer ignored what his responsibilities 
were as a lawyer. Apparently he still does not understand 
these responsibilities. Froerer's conflict of interest is a 
part of the malpractice claim created by his shoddy representa-
tion of the Combes' interests, not a defense to that claim. 
Froerer also contends that this conflict gave the 
Combes the duty to determine whether he was adequately repre-
senting their interests. However, because of the sensitive 
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nature of the fiduciary duties owed by a lawyer, the law 
imposes a high standard of care upon the lawyer. Smoot v. 
Lund, 13 Utah 2d 168, 369 P.2d 933 (1962).- It is the 
lawyer's responsibility, not the client's, to clear up any 
potential for misunderstanding over the scope of the lawyer's 
legal representation. See, Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P. 2d 
1195, 1203-1204 (Utah 1985). 
Margulies does not, as Froerer contends, create a 
different standard for the establishment of the attorney-client 
relationship in conflict of interest as opposed to legal 
malpractice cases. In Margulies the Utah Supreme Court found 
that the disqualified law firm had established at least an 
implied attorney-client relationship with the limited partners 
of a limited partnership who had reason to believe the law firm 
was representing their individual interests. However, the 
court did not address any malpractice implications raised by 
the conflict. 696 P.2d at 1200. 
Contrary to Froerer's argument, the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (now known as the Rules of Professional 
-
/
 While Smoot v. Lund sets forth the correct legal 
standard, the Developers' reliance on this case is misplaced 
because factually it is not on point. In Smoot, the client was 
not misled by the attorney. Here, the Combes were misled by 
Froerer both as to the status of Froerer's title work and 
Froerer's role in the sale transaction. 
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Conduct) certainly is one source for determining the standard 
of care owed by Froerer to the Combes. Froerer's violation of 
that standard by representing other clients with conflicting 
interests in the same transaction, along with his other errors 
and omissions, established a prima facie case of legal 
malpractice. 
III. 
THE COMBES WERE INJURED BY BREACH OF FROERER'S 
AND ATGF'S DUTY TO DO THE TITLE WORK IN AN 
ACCURATE AND TIMELY FASHION. 
ATGF argues that it owed no duties to the Combes, 
either in contract on the title policy, or in tort as an 
abstractor of title.-'' Both ATGF and Froerer also argue that 
the Combes were not damaged by any breach of duty, because the 
Combes were charged with knowledge of the easement as the 
owners of the property, and received the same property back in 
the recission as they conveyed. All of these arguments are 
faulty. 
Addressing ATGF's duties on the title policy first, 
ATGF cannot explain away the ambiguities in the title policy. 
These ambiguities created disputed issues of material fact over 
the proper interpretation of the policy. Whether it was 
—' While ATGF complains of certain pleading ambi-
guities, the district court construed the pleadings broadly 
enough to address all of the issues raised in the Combes' 
opposition to ATGF's motion for summary judgment. These are 
the same issued raised on this appeal. 
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reasonable for the Combes to believe that their interests, as 
well as the Developers' interests, were protected by this 
policy could not be resolved summarily. 
The policy must be interpreted from the standpoint of 
a layman, not a lawyer. Accordingly, while lawyers may be 
expected to understand the fine distinctions between "legal" 
and "equitable" interests in real property, laymen do not.-1' 
More important, there is no evidence in the record that the 
Combes understood this distinction. To the contrary, the 
Combes were very unsophisticated in real estate matters. This 
is why Froerer was retained. Unfortunately for the Combes, 
Froerer was wearing at least three hats—lawyer for the Combes, 
lawyer for the Developers, and title agent of ATGF. 
Similarly, how were the Combes supposed to know that 
an "owners" policy did not protect their interest as "owners" 
of the legal interest in the property? How would the Combes 
have known that what they really needed was a "lenders" policy, 
when they weren't loaning money to anyone? Froerer certainly 
didn't tell them. All the title policy (again, prepared by 
Froerer but in what capacity?) had to do in order to avoid any 
±y
 Lach v. Deseret Bank, 746 P. 2d 802 (Utah App. 
1987), relied upon by ATGF, dealt with the legal effect of a 
judgment lien on a seller's interest in real property, not with 
the question of the ambiguous use in a contract of the term 
"equitable estate." 
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ambiguity was simply identify the insureds by name. This was 
not done here, and ATGF and Froerer must bear the risk of the 
resulting ambiguities. 
ATGF contends that these ambiguities were resolved by 
the real estate contract since it required the policy to be 
delivered to the Developers. However, the Combes were justi-
fied in believing that the policy was being procured for their 
benefit as well, since their lawyer, Froerer, drafted this 
provision in the contract, agreed to do the title work, and 
prepared the policy. 
While ATGF now disclaims any liability for Froerer's 
legal malpractice, it was in ATGF's interests to have a lawyer 
as a title agent. A lawyer is in a unique position to solicit 
title insurance by, as here, inserting a title insurance 
requirement in a real estate contract for a client, and then 
offering to write that insurance, to the benefit of his other 
"client", the title insurer. Certainly, ATGF cannot expect to 
reap the benefits of this dual agency, without shouldering the 
burdens as well. 
ATGF also argues that it would be against "customary 
real estate practices" for the seller, rather than the buyer, 
to be protected by title insurance. However, ATGF cites to no 
evidence in the record that such a "custom" exists, or that the 
Combes were aware of any such custom. Instead, ATGF improperly 
asks this Court to take "judicial notice." 
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The question of what is customary in real estate 
transactions really is part of the next issue, ATGF's liability 
in tort. If this Court is to take notice of anything, it ought 
to take notice that in most real estate transactions, especi-
ally those involving inexperienced sellers such as the Combes, 
the seller relies on title insurance to advise him or her of 
the status of title, regardless of who the technical "insured" 
may be. As here, the seller needs to know whether there will 
be any problems in performing on warranties of title. Contrary 
to ATGF's argument at page 12 of its brief, the "better 
reasoned cases", which are also in the majority, hold that a 
negligent title insurer has liability in tort as well as on the 
policy. See, White v. Western Title Insurance Co., 710 P.2d 
309 (Cal. 1985 en banc); Shada v. Title Trust Co. of Florida, 
457 So.2d 553 (Fla. App. 1984); Malinak v. Safeco Title Insur-
ance Co. of Idaho, 661 P.2d 12 (Mont. 1983); Heyd v. Chicago 
Title Insurance Co., 354 N.W. 2d 154 (Neb. 1984); Moore v. 
Title Insurance Co. of Minnesota, 714 P.2d 1303 (Ariz. 1985); 
Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 84 0 
F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1988). 
Neither this Court nor the Utah Supreme Court has 
squarely addressed the issue. However, dicta in Bush v. Coult, 
594 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1979) (stating that title insurance 
warrants title), suggests that the Supreme Court would follow 
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the majority rule. This is the rule that is consistent with 
the realities of most real estate transactions. 
The distinction ATGF attempts to draw between negli-
gence liability on a title insurance report or commitment as 
opposed to a title policy is unpersuasive. Where, as here, a 
title policy is issued without a preliminary commitment, there 
is no basis for such a distinction. If anything, the reasons 
for imposing negligence liability on the policy are stronger. 
In this instance, the policy was both an abstract of title, 
creating duties in tort, as well as a contract of insurance. 
Moreover, if, as ATGF contends, the Combes were not covered by 
the policy, then the waiver of negligence provision in the 
policy relied on by ATGF does not apply to them. Of course 
this assumes that a title policy is the type of adhesion con-
tract in which Utah public policy would permit such a waiver, 
which is doubtful. See, DRC, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P. 2d 
433, 438 (Utah 1983); Bush v. Coult, supra. 
Assuming the title policy created ATGF duties in tort 
as well as contract, the question then becomes to whom those 
tort duties were owed. Under Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
§ 552 (1977), and general tort law, ATGF owed duties to all 
those who could reasonably be expected to rely upon the title 
policy, or timely performance of the title work. This includes 
the Combes, as the sellers in this "customary" real estate 
transaction. 
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The questions of whether and to whom a duty in tort is 
owed are usually characterized as legal issues. However, even 
the case law relied upon by ATGF suggests that these issues 
cannot be resolved without a careful examination of all the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the particular transaction 
at issue. See, Transamerica Title Insurance Co. v. Johnson, 
693 P.2d 697 (Wash. 1985). Here, the factual complexity added 
by the many roles Froerer played certainly made these issues 
not susceptible to summary judgment. 
The arguments of Froerer and ATGF that the Conobes suf-
fered no damage are even less persuasive. Landowners cannot, 
as a matter of law, be charged with knowledge of unknown title 
defects, especially defects not of their own making. Other-
wise, the Developers would be charged with the same knowledge 
as the Combes. The very real possibility of title problems 
unknown to the owner is the whole reason title insurance 
exists. If, as a matter of law, landowners were to be charged 
with knowledge of unknown title defects, this would be all the 
more reason for them to rely on the title insurer.-' 
-' Despite the insinuations of ATGF, Froerer and 
the Developers, there is no evidence that Keith Combe and his 
wife were aware of the pipeline at the time of sale. The pipe-
line condemnation occurred years before Keith and his wife took 
title, at a time when Keith had no involvement with the pro-
perty. Tr. 213-216. The condemnation award was paid to his 
parents. 
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The contention that the recission resulted in no loss 
or damage to the Combes makes no more sense. The net result is 
that the Combes will be required to sell the property in order 
to pay the $370,000 Judgment. However, because the property is 
now worth only about $280,000 (as opposed to the $410,880 sales 
price in 1979), they will still owe the Developers over 
$90,000. Tr. 193-194. In Citicorp Savings of Illinois v. 
Stewart Title Guar. Co., supra, the court held the negligent 
title insurer liable for loss in value of the insured property 
caused by market factors not directly related to the undis-
closed title defect. Damages resulting from a buyer's claim of 
recission based on allegedly undisclosed and uncurable title 
defects in property, preceded by loss in market value of the 
property, are certainly forseeable enough to present to a jury 
either on a proximate cause theory in tort, or a consequential 
damage theory in contract. 
If the title work had been done correctly and on time, 
one of two things would have happened. The first possibility 
is that the Developers would not have gone through with the 
sale, and the Combes would have had the opportunity to sell the 
property to other developers while market values were still 
high. See, n. 6, infra. The more likely possibility (in light 
of the engineers' admitted contemporaneous knowledge of the 
pipeline) is that the sale would have gone forward, with any 
claim for recission precluded, and the Combes' opportunity to 
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enforce their contractual rights intact. ATGF and Froerer are 
liable for their errors and omissions that precluded the Combes 
from exercising either opportunity. 
IV. 
FROERER'S STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT 
IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT AND IS 
SUBSTANTIVELY WITHOUT MERIT. 
Froerer did not raise the four-year statute of limita-
tions in his summary judgment motion, nor did the district 
court rule on the issue in granting that motion. A summary 
judgment may not be affirmed on grounds other than those relied 
upon by the lower court, unless those grounds are at least 
argued below. See, Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills 
Development Co. , 614 P. 2d 155 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, the 
question of when the statute began to run may not be raised on 
this appeal. Nonetheless, the lack of substantive merit to 
Froerer1s argument also will be addressed briefly. 
Neither the Utah Supreme Court nor this Court appear 
to have directly decided when a legal malpractice right of 
action arises under Utah law for purposes of the statute of 
limitations. The courts in other jurisdictions are divided. 
However, a number of courts hold that the statute does not 
begin to run until the client is damaged. See, Ft. Myers 
Seafood Packers, Inc. v. Steptoe & Johnson, 381 F.2d 261 (D.C. 
Cir. 1967); cert, den. , 390 U.S. 946 (1968) Melgard v. Hanna, 
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607 P.2d 795 (Ore. App. 1980); Cox v. Rosser, 579 S.W.2d 73 
(Tex. App. 1979). Under the law of a number of other jurisdic-
tions, the statute does not begin to run until the client 
discovers the malpractice. See, Neei v. Magana, Olney, Levy, 
Cathcart & Gelfand, 491 P. 2d 421 (Cal. 1971); Petes v. Simmons, 
552 P.2d 1053 (Wash. 1976). 
Under either of these theories, the Combes' cross-
claim for legal malpractice filed in August, 1986 was timely. 
The Combes had no reason to know of Froerer' s negligence until 
receipt of the accurate title policy in February, 1983. Then 
they were specifically told the Developers would look to 
Froerer to solve the problem. The Combes had no potential 
claims for damages until October, 1984 when the Developers' 
recission claim was filed. 
In Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105, 51 P. 261 (1897), 
the client's cause of action against his attorney for conver-
sion of certain promissory notes given to the attorney for 
collection did not accrue until demand for return of the notes 
was made and refused. Assuming Stevens is still good law, it 
indicates the Utah Supreme Court is likely to follow the rule 
that the statute does not begin to run until damage occurs, 
i.e., the refusal or failure to return the notes in Stevens. 
This rule is also the one that makes the most sense as 
applied to the facts of the case at hand. The Combes had no 
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reason to even consider a claim against Froerer until the 
Developers asserted their recission claims. Until then, it was 
the Developers who were indicating through their agents that 
they intended to pursue claims against Froerer. So long as the 
Developers were performing and affirming the contract, the 
Combes were not injured. Any premature claim that the Combes 
filed against Froerer would have been dismissed for that very 
reason. 
In sum, an important and far reaching issue of first 
impression under Utah law should not be decided until it is 
properly before the appellate court. However, under any 
reasonable or fair theory, the Combes' malpractice claim 
against Froerer was timely. 
V. 
BIFURCATION ON THE EVE OF TRIAL WAS UNTIMELY 
AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE COMBES. 
All three respondents contend that the last minute 
bifurcation of the Developers' claims against Froerer and ATGF, 
to which these parties stipulated but the Combes objected, was 
proper. However, these three parties cannot stipulate away the 
prejudice to the Combes. 
Respondents offer no justification for their delay in 
submitting this stipulation, which was typical of their tactics 
throughout the litigation in the lower court. Instead they 
merely argue that the claims between themselves were of no 
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concern to the Combes. ATGF admits that part of the justifica-
tion given to the district court for the belated stipulation 
was that the bifurcated claims likely would be settled. How-
ever, no such settlement was ever reached. 
Respondents ignore the prejudice to the Combes that 
resulted not just from the bifurcation itself, but from the 
accompanying exclusion of all evidence related to the errors 
and omissions of Froerer, including those contained in the ATGF 
title policy. This prevented the Combes from defending the 
damage claim at issue on the basis that Froerer and ATGF, not 
the Combes, were the cause of any injury to the Developers. 
The Developers' own agents had admitted this to Keith Combe 
before the action was ever filed, telling him not to worry. 
Equity requires that all of the surrounding circumstances be 
considered in fashioning the proper form of the recission 
remedy. This remedy could include such things as apportionment 
of restitution among all of the liable parties, according to 
fault. 
The prejudice to the Combes in being prevented from 
presenting any of these theories was compounded by the fact 
that the bifurcation stipulation was timed so late as to pre-
clude the Combes from developing alternative theories. This 
prejudice clearly outweighs any prejudice that the respondents 
speculate would have resulted from a trial that included all of 
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the parties. Although the abuse of discretion standard is a 
narrow one, it has been met in this case. 
VI. 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERRORS IN 
CALCULATING FAIR RENTAL VALUE WITHOUT REGARD 
TO FAIR MARKET VALUE AND IN AWARDING PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST TO THE DEVELOPERS. 
If, as argued above, the summary judgment of rescis-
sion was erroneous and must be reversed, then this Court need 
not reach the issues of restitutionary damages or prejudgment 
interest. Nonetheless, the Combes will briefly address the 
damage issue. The Developers apparently concede that the pre-
judgment interest award was improper, since they failed to 
address that issue in their brief. 
While the Developers characterize the issue of the 
amount of the fair rental value offset as a battle of the 
experts, the district court's error was not in weighing the 
evidence or evaluating the credibility of the witnesses. 
Instead, the lower court made a legal error in failing to 
consider a basic element of the fair rental value equation that 
the Utah Supreme Court has said needs to be considered—the 
fair market value of the property at its highest and best use. 
See, Warner v. Rasmussen, 704 P.2d 559 (Utah 1985) and the 
other cases cited at p. 46 of the Combes' opening brief. 
In failing to consider this element, the district 
court also ignored the economic realities of the transaction. 
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If the Combes had not sold the property to the Developers, they 
would have had the opportunity to sell it to other developers 
for a price equal to or above the price the Developers were 
willing to pay.-x From an equivalent sale, the Combes also 
would have received the same or more annual income than they 
received from the sale to the Developers, but were required to 
return by the court. The Developers' occupancy and use of the 
property for almost five years deprived the Combes of this 
opportunity. The purpose of the rescission remedy is to return 
the parties to their positions at the time of the transaction 
being rescinded. See, Shepard v. Dick, 453 P.2d 134 (Kan. 
1969). The amount of the rental offset awarded to the Combes 
failed to do this. 
The court also failed to take into account that the 
reason the value of the property had declined so dramatically 
was because of the inequitable conduct-' of the Developers in 
failing to claim rescission before the bottom fell out of the 
—' The evidence at trial established that another 
buyer, James Keizerman, was willing to pay a higher price for 
the property. Like the Developers' planners, Keizerman didn't 
perceive the pipeline to be a significant impediment to 
development at the time. Tr. 334-343. 
-
I/
 While the Developers accuse the Combes of 
inequitable conduct in seeking both the property and the money 
due on the contract, this is unfounded. All the Combes ever 
sought was what they were entitled to under the contract. 
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real estate market. Even if the court had not been required to 
consider these equities, the case law relied upon by the 
Developers would have required the court to consider their 
delay as a failure to mitigate damages. See, University Club 
v. Invesco-Holdinq Corp., supra. 
Because none of these factors was considered by the 
district court, its damage judgment must be reversed, as well 
as the award of prejudgment interest not addressed in the 
Developers' brief. 
CONCLUSION 
At every critical stage in these proceedings, the 
district court made crucial legal errors that deprived the 
Combes of their right to a trial of all of the factual issues 
between all of the parties. Accordingly, the Combes respect-
fully renew their request that the summary judgments be 
reversed and that such a trial be ordered. Alternatively, the 
damage and prejudgment interest awards must be stricken or 
remanded for new trial or recalculation. 
DATED this 10th day of August, 1989. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Jfcm^ s A. Boevers 
Attorneys for Appellants Keith P. 
and Evelyn Combe 
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COURT OF APPEALS 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Breuer-Harrison, Inc., et al. 
v. Keith P. Combe, et al. 
Case No. 880353-CA 
Argued; March 29, 1990 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, respondent Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. calls 
the court's attention to the recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
Culp Construction Company v. Build-Mart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4 (decided June 27, 1990). 
ed hereto. 
A copy of the case is attach-
This case pertains to Point II as set forth in the Brief 
of Respondent Attorneys1 Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and speci-
ficially to the authorities beginning at page 12. Respondent 
in its brief pointed out that there existed a split of author-
ities on the issue of abstracter's tort liability. Culp 
adopts the position urged by respondent and holds that a title 
insurance company incurs liability only under its contract of 
insurance when it issues a policy of title insurance and does 
not incur liability for abstracter's negligence for any omis-
sions in its statement of the status of the title to the 
property insured. The decision in Culp appears to eliminate 
appellant Combes' claim based upon abstracter's negligence. 
The issue of negligent mispresentation as discussed in 
Culp is not material because it is undisputed in the instant 
case that no preliminary title report was ever issued or 
relied upon. 
Hopefully the above will be of assistance to the court in 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals 
July llf 1990 
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resolving the issues of this case. 
Very truly yours, 
David E. West 
Attorney for Attorneys1 
Title Guaranty Fundf Inc. 
DEW:bh 
c.c. John P. Ashton 
Erik Strindberg 
Jack L. Schoenhals 
Theodore E. Kannell 
4 White v. Slai 
•? J37 Utah At 
chon over a case while it is under advisement 
on appeal J Wc have made exceptions to the 
rule in the interest of preventing unnecessary 
delay, where any action by the trial court is I 
not likely to modify a party's rights with 
respect to the issues raised on appeal Thus in 
Peters v Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P 2d 71 
(1964), we held that the district court, which 
has continuing jurisdiction after entry of a I 
final divorce decree, may adjudicate a petition 
to modify the decree due to a change of arc 
umstances while the decree is pending on 
appeal since the petition for modification is I 
collateral to the divorce decree Similarly, I 
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as 
final a judgment against one party in a multi 
party action, the remainder of the action 
remains in the trial court and is not necessarily 
affected by the appeal In that case, the trial | 
court has jurisdiction* to proceed with the 
claims remaining unadjudicated Lane v 
Mcsscr, 689 P 2d 1333 (Utah 1984) 
In the instant case, defendants seek to 
reduce the judgment against them by amounts 
which they aver have already been paid to 
plaintiff « An adjudication of the motion, 
though a modification of the judgment may 
result, will not affect the legal issues raised 
here with respect to attorney fees and defen 
dams' liability Under these circumstances, wc 
see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while 
the distnet court has the matter under consi-
deration, as that will only delay proceedings 
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule 
60(b) motion and may deny it without interf 
erence from this court If the motion is 
granted, the trial court in this case need only 
advise this court that the judgment has been 
modified The district court action granting or 
denying the motion and the modified judg 
ment should be included in the record when it 
is prepared for review by this court 
Defendants' motion to stay proceedings and 
remand the case to the district court is denied, 
and the district court is directed to hear and 
determine the rule 60(b) motion 
1 Indeed it hus been observed thai the rule prov 
»dcs a "nice balance between the interest In finality 
|of judgments] and the desire to achieve Justice " 
Wright A Miller 11 / cdcrul Practice and Procedure 
§2872(1973) 
2 Long v Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F 2d 
1310 13l8(9thCir 1981) 
3 See eg Smith v Kunball, 76 Utah 350, 289 l» 
588(1930) 
4 We of course, express no opinion on the merits 
of the motion that being for the trial court to del 
ermine 
le of Utah %gg«gg 
IvJtcjLj . 
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IN T H E SUPREME COURT 
OF T H E STATE OF UTAH 
CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and 
Federal Insurance Company, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited 
partnership, et al , 
Defendants, 
and 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association, 
Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, and 
I Appellant, 
v. 
Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation, 
Defendant, Third-Party Defendant, and 
Appellee. 
No. 880388 
FILED: June 27, 1990 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
Honorable Raymond S Uno 
ATTORNEYS: 
John P. Ashton, Brian S King, Salt Lake 
City, and John A. Kincaid, Jr , John R. 
O'Keefc, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for 
appellant 
Jeffrey R Ontt, Robert S Howell, Salt Lake 
City, and Mark T. Davenport, Doug T. 
Butler, Dallas, Texas, for appellee 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion appeals from a grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corporation The trial court found that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed with 
regard to Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association's complaint that Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation owed Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan a duty to disclose all record 
title information Wc affirm In part and 
reverse in part. 
FACTS 
i On appeal from summary judgment, wc 
look at the facts in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment.' 
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a Utah 
limited partnership, was established to develop 
I and construct, in Salt Lake County, a retail 
I shopping mall and warehouse distribution 
center specializing in custom building mater-
I J«I, i?i,nsf.n« for the nroiect was essentially 
CODE • co Culp Construction C 
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pment revenue bonds ("IRBs") in the face 
amount of $7,750,000 First Security Bank of 
Utah, N A ("first Security"), acted as inde-
nture trustee on the IRB loan through its 
corporate trust department The deed of trust 
securing the IRB loan was recorded on Sept-
ember 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office 
During the summer of 1984, the principal of 
the project determined that a funding shortfall 
of approximately $500,000 existed for the 
completion of the project Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan Association ("Tower") was 
approached by a mortgage broker, Richards-
Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-
Woodbury"), with respect to lending Build-
mart Mall $750,000, secured by a second 
position deed of trust to the project, in order 
to complete construction 
Richards-Woodbury retained Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to 
provide a commitment for title insurance and 
issue a title insurance policy. Richmond Title 
Company ("Richmond Title"), the local agent 
for Lawyers Title, furnished Richards-
Woodbury with a commitment for title insu-
rance that revealed certain encumbrances and 
hens against the title Richmond Title also 
acted as local agent for Lawyers Title in 
writing the subsequent title policy 
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K Woodbury, 
acting as agent for Tower, wrote a letter to 
Richmond Title delineating escrow instructions 
for the funds to be loaned by Tower Rich-
mond Title was instructed, among other 
things, to deposit the funds into an escrow 
account and to release the funds to Buildmart 
Mall only when Richmond Title had taken 
steps to "insure that the Trust Deed enclosed 
herewith is in a second hen position behind 
(First Security Bank)" and "[tjhe only prior 
exceptions to the Trust Deed should be those 
listed in your Commitment for Title Insur-
ance." In addition, the escrow instructions 
directed Richmond that if it was "unable or 
unwilling to promptly follow all of the above 
referenced instructions," it was to forego dis-
bursement of the funds. 
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but after 
the commitment for title insurance ("the 
commitment") had been issued, numerous 
hens appeared of record that were not repo-
rted by Lawyers Title or Richmond Title on 
the commitment Richmond nevertheless dis-
bursed the funds, and the Tower loan was 
secured by a second deed of trust that was 
recorded on March 20, 1985, in the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder. 
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the devel-
oper defaulted on its loan with Tower, as well 
as its obligations under the IRB loan Culp 
Construction Company ("Culp"), the devel-
oper's primary general contractor, filed a 
. v. Buildmart Mall 
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I. BRFACII OF CONTRACT 
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title 
breached a contractual duty to accurately 
report the status of the title at the time the 
Tower loan was closed The record reveals 
that the only contractual privity Tower had 
with Lawyers Title was the title insurance 
policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title 
through its local agent, Richmond Title 
The essence o( Tower's claim is that as part 
of the title insurance process, Lawyers Title 
issued a commitment for title insuiance to 
Richards-Woodbury that was not updated 
and upon which Tower relied in making the 
loan Tower claims that certain mechanic's 
hens of record uere not included as an update 
to the commitment and that additional hens 
would have indicated a "red flag" that the 
project was underfunded, which would have 
caused Tower to decline advancing any loan 
funds to Buildmart 
Lawyers Title presents three arguments to 
support summar> judgment on the breach ol 
contract issue. Its first argument is that the 
only contract it had with Tower was the title 
insurance policy itself and that it fulfilled nil 
requirements of the policy. Second, Lawyers 
Title argues that the commitment for title 
insurance that preceded the title policy was 
issued to Richards Woodbury, not to Tower, 
and therefore no privity existed between 
Lawyers Title and Tower with regard to the 
commitment Third, Lawyers Title argues that 
a commitment or preliminary title report is not 
ered us defense of the litigation to Lawyers 
Title under the terms of the title insurance 
policy Lawyers Title accepted the tender of 
defense subject to a reservation of rights 
First Security initiated nonjudicial forcclo 
sure proceedings against the project as trustee 
under the indenture of trust and, on March 
16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at which First 
Security acquired the project As a result of 
the foreclosure proceedings, all hens junior to 
the first hen held by first Security, including 
the Tower trust deed, were extinguished by 
operation of law Tower and its counsel did 
not take any action to stop the foreclosure sale 
or protect its security interest. 
A settlement was reached between all 
parties, resulting in the dismissal of all claims 
with prejudice, with the exception of the 
claims between Tower and Lawyers Title All 
outstanding mechanic's liens on the project 
were released as part of the settlement 
On appeal from summary judgment in favor 
of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that there are 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
three causes of action breach of contract, 
breach of an implied contractual obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing, and negligent 
misrepresentation 
I!o. v. Buildmart Mall cooc^co 
any estate or Interest therein, toge-
ther with a statement of all liens, 
charges, or liabilities to which the 
same may be subject, and of which 
is In any way material for purcha-
sers to be apprised An epitome of 
the record evidence of title, inclu-
ding maps, plats, and other aids ° 
The function, form, and character of a title 
insurer is different from that of an abstractor 
One who hires a title insurance company docs 
so for the purpose of obtaining the assurance 
or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in 
the chain of title rather than for the purpose 
of discovering the title status. A title insurance 
company's function is generally confined to 
the practice of insurance, not to the practice 
of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not 
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of its 
| status as a title insurance company. 
Culp Construction C 
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h is lirst to be observed that lawyers Ink 
fully and adequately defended Tower's second 
hen position as it was obligated to do by the 
terms of the title insurance policy For that 
reason, Tower s cause of action for breach of 
an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing 
or the duty to bargain in good faith is unsu 
pportcd by the facts Hence, we affirm the 
conclusion of the tml court that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists with respect to 
breach of the contractual duty of good faith 
and lair dealing ' 
As to whether a title insurance company is 
an abstractor of title, some jurisdictions hold 
title insurance companies to the standard of 
liability generally associated with abstractors J 
However, we believe that the better-reasoned 
approach is to consider preliminary title 
reports and commitments for title insurance as 
"no more than a statement of the terms and 
conditions upon which the insurer is willing to 
issue its title policy "4 Indeed, "(tine prev-
ailing view remains not to impose liability in 
tort on a title company "5 
Utah Code Ann §31A 1-301(82) (1986 
& Supp 1989) defines title insurance as 
the insuring, guaranteeing, or ind-
emnifying of owners of real or 
personal property or the holders of 
liens or encumbrances on that pro 
pcrty, or others interested in the 
property against loss or damage 
suffered by reason of hens or enc-
umbrances upon delects in, or the 
unmarkctabihty of the title to the 
property, or invalidity or unenfor-
ceability of any hens or encumbra 
nceson the property 
It is also to be observed that a duty is 
imposed by statute upon title insurers to make 
a reasonable search and examination of title 
for the purpose of determining insurability 
Utah Code Ann §31A-20-110(1) (1986) 
states in part "No title insurance policy may 
be written until the title insurer or its agent 
has conducted a reasonable search and exam 
ination of the title and has made a determm 
ation of insurability of title under sound 
underwriting principles " Nevertheless, even 
though section 31A 20 110(1) imposes a 
duty of a reasonable search and examination 
for the purpose of determining the insurability 
of title, it does not impose a duty to abstract 
titles upon title insurance companies 
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah 
Code, however, "abstract of title" has been 
defined as 
(a) condensed history of the title to 
land, consisting qf a synopsis or 
summary of the material or opera-
tive portion of all the conveyances. 
II. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The next claim asserted by Tower is that 
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond 
Title, negligently misrepresented the state of 
the title in the commitment for title insurance 
The trial court held that because "negligent 
misrepresentation" is a tort claim, it could not 
be asserted separately from the breach of 
contract claim when the alleged misrepresent 
ation arose out of the contractual relationship 
of the parties according to our decision in Beck 
v Farmers Insurance Exchange.1 
In Beck, an insured brought an action 
against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to 
settle a claim for insured motorist benefits 
The insured alleged breach of contract, breach 
of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress With regard to the emotional distress 
tort claim, we held that "in a first party 
relationship between an insurer and us 
insured, the duties and obligations of the 
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary 
Without more, a breach of those implied or 
express duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort "• However, 
our holding in Beck does not preclude the 
bringing of a tort claim independently of a 
contract claim. In Beck, we specifically stated 
"We recognize that in some cases the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also 
result in breaches of duty that are independent 
of the contract and may give rise to causes of 
action in tort."* Statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action under 
various unfair practices acts may also give rise 
I to independent tort actions >• 
Negligent misrepresentation occurs "Iwjhere 
one having a pecuniary interest in a transac-
tion, is in a superior position to know material 
J facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a 
C O D B » C O 
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suffers loss in that transaction "" 1 unlit 
rmore, "privity of contract is not a necessary 
prerequisite to liability "" 
In the instant case, Tower asserts a cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation because 
Lawyers Title provided a commitment for title 
insurance to Richards-Woodbury, a mort-
gage broker, with the knowledge that Tower 
would rely upon the commitment in making 
the loan Genuine issues of material fact exist 
with regard to whether Lawyers Title knew 
that Tower would rely upon the commitment 
in making the loan Indications of reliance on 
the commitment may arise from the fact that 
the title insurance policy was issued to both 
Richards-Woodbury and Tower In addition, 
the escrow instructions given to Lawyers 
Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal that the 
loan was contingent upon the status of the 
title remaining the same at the time of closing 
as it was when the commitment was provided. 
Lawyers Title argues that because a comm-
itment is not an abstract of title, Tower could 
not reasonably rely upon it as a comprehensive 
statement of the status of the title. We have 
heretofore concluded that the commitment for 
title insurance or a preliminary title report in 
this case was not an abstract of title; however, 
it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent, 
Richmond Title, may have assumed the duties 
and responsibilities of an abstractor when it 
received the escrow instructions from Tower's 
agent which explicitly directed Richmond not 
to transfer the loan funds unless the title 
status remained the same as stated on the 
commitment 
We hold that summary judgment on the 
issue of negligent misrepresentation was ina-
ppropriate because our decision in Beck docs 
not preclude a separate independent tort In 
addition, material factual issues remain as to 
whether Lawyers Title owed a contractual duty 
to Tower to represent the true status of the 
title upon receipt and acceptance of the escrow 
instructions and at all times thereafter when 
Lawyers Title knew, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have known, of 
additional mechanic's liens against the subject 
property. Should it be determined that 
Lawyers Title owed Tower a duty of disclo-
sure, other questions of material fact also 
exist, including whether that duty was brea-
ched and whether Tower reasonably relied 
upon the commitment, thereby defeating a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion 
WE CONCUR. 
I Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D Zimmerman, Justice 
Judith M. Billings, Court of Appeals Judge 
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Court of Appeals Judge, sat 
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STEWART, Justice 
Plaintiff r*hn<f«»nc#>n Mi C.nffith Cnnstruc-
State of Utah 
KfP, I 
C O D G • CO 
Provo Utah 
judgment dismissing its complaint against 
defendant State of Utah Defendant and 
counterclaimant Staker Paving and Constru-
ction appeals the grant of summary judgment 
entered in favor of the State dismissing 
Staker's counterclaim against the State 
I. FACTS 
Christensen & Griffith contracted with 
Provo City to construct the East Bay Golf 
Course Construction of the golf course began 
in mid-March of 1984 At approximately the 
same time, the State began building two dikes 
running parallel to and along both sides of 
Interstate 15 ("1-15"), the major freeway 
running north and south through Provo. To 
the east of 1-15 lies a range of mountains 
Runoff water drains from the mountains and 
flows westward toward Utah Lake, which lies 
to the west of 1-15 
The East Bay Golf Course is located imm-
ediately east of 1-15, between the mountains 
and the freeway. At this location, the roadbed 
on which 1-15 lies acts as a dam or dike, 
stopping the flow of water from the mount-
ains toward the lake. Because of this condi-
tion, several culverts were constructed under-
neath 1-15 to allow water to flow unimpeded 
to Utah Lake. 
As part of the State's diking project in 
1984, the culverts under 1-15 had to be ext-
ended to run under the new dikes. To facili-
tate the culvert extension, the State's contra-
ctor, Staker Paving, built coffer dams. These 
coffer dams were mounds of earth built 
around the culverts and the areas into which 
the culverts would be extended The water 
trapped behind the coffer dams was pumped 
out to create a dry area in which the extens-
ions on the ends of the culverts could be built 
However, with the coffer dams in place, the 
water could not flow through the culverts 
toward Utah Lake. 
Christensen & Griffith alleges that the State 
and Staker negligently allowed the coffer dams 
to remain in place after Staker's project was 
completed, thus damming the water and 
causing the water level on the east side of I-
15 to rise Christensen & Griffith alleges 
further that this caused flooding in the area of 
construction of the golf course. Christensen & 
Onffith complains that this made their work 
much more difficult. The work was slowed 
because of the necessity to work in water, the 
need to use draglines Instead of backhoes, and 
the need to move material twice. 
Plaintiffs Provo City and Christensen & 
Griffith originally filed this action on May 13, 
1985 The Stale filed un answer and cross-
claim against its contractor Staker. Staker 
filed an answer to the original complaint and 
to the State's cross-claim and also filed a 
CODE* Co 
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Staker based on an argument that the State 
was immune from suit for flood-related 
activities under a 1984 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann §63-30-3. The State's motion 
was granted as to both of plaintiffs* claims 
and as to Staker's counterclaim Provo City 
and Christensen & Griffith independently 
appealed the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the State The appeal of Provo City 
was dismissed after it settled out of court with 
the State Staker also appealed the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the State 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A grant of summary judgment is appropr-
iate only where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law Utah R. Civ 
P. 56(c); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt 
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 773 P 2d 1382, 
1385 (Utah 1989) When we review a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment, we 
analyze the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Copper 
State Leasing Co v. Blacker Appliance & 
Furniture Co., 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988) 
We review the trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness Madsen v Borthick, 769 P 2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988) 
III ANALYSIS 
A. Statute 
Utah Code Ann 
ides as follows: 
§63-30-3 (1989) prov-
Exccpt as may be otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, all governm-
ental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental func-
tion, g o v e r n m e n t a l l y - o w n e d 
hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional 
health care clinical training program 
conducted in cither public or private 
facilities 
The management of flood waters 
and other natural disasters and the 
construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered 
to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their 
officers are immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from 
those activities 
(Emphasis added ) The State argues that (he 
immunity granted for flood control manage-
ment is absolute and not subject to the waivers 
of immunity provided in sections 63-30-5 
through 63-30-10 5 of the Governmental 
immunity ") Christensen & Griffith argues that 
the second paragraph should be read to 
provide only a qualified immunity for flood 
control activities, which would make the 
immunity subject to the waiver provisions 
(This argument is hereinafter referred to as the 
argument for "qualified immunity ") The 
central issue in this case is the choice between 
these two positions 
B I egislative History 
The amendment adding the second parag-
raph to §63-30-3 was enacted in 1984 as 
part of Senate Bill No. 97, entitled "Flood 
Rehef-1984 " 1984 Utah Laws ch 33, §1 
This governmental immunity amendment was 
only a small part of a larger act which prov-
ided for various actions by different state 
agencies to respond to recent flooding and 
expected flooding Senator Finhnson, the 
Senate sponsor of the bill, discussed the 
purpose of the amendment to §63-30-3 on 
the Senate floor 
And what we're really trying to do 
is encourage the public sector to 
take action to prevent damage Salt 
Lake City is probably one of the, 
and the Salt Lake County program 
with the tremendous effort they did 
through their f lood control 
program It did cost money but 
they saved, you know, millions of 
dollars worth of damage to the 
private sector and we want them to 
be able to make good decisions 
relative to flood control without 
worrying about somebody coming 
back and suing [them] less (sic] and 
second guessing [themj in that very 
situation 
1984 Senate Bill No 97, Day 20 (Saturday, 
January 28, 1984, afternoon session) 
(emphasis added) This statement indicates 
that in enacting this amendment, the legisla-
ture intended to encourage governmental ent-
ities to take action to prevent damage from 
expected flooding 
Senator Finltnson's statement is consistent 
with either an absolute or a qualified immu-
nity interpretation of §63-30-3. The stat-
ement is consistent with the qualified immu-
nity interpretation because Senator rinlinsou 
stated that the legislature wanted public sector 
decision-makers to be able to make decisions 
relating to flood control without worrying 
about someone "second guessing" them. This 
purpose is met by classifying flood control 
activities as "governmental functions " If 
flood control is classified as a "governmental 
function," a governmental entity would be 
liable for ordinary negligence committed in 
flood control activities, but would not ncccs-
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COURT OF APPEALS 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Re: Breuer-Harrison, Inc., et al. 
v. Keith P. Combe, et al. 
Case No. 880353-CA 
Argued; March 29, 1990 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure, respondent Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. calls 
the court's attention to the recent Utah Supreme Court case of 
Culp Construction Company v. Build-Mart Mall, 137 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 4 (decided June 27, 1990). A copy of the case is attach-
ed hereto. 
This case pertains to Point II as set forth in the Brief 
of Respondent Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. and speci-
ficially to the authorities beginning at page 12. Respondent 
in its brief pointed out that there existed a split of author-
ities on the issue of abstracter's tort liability. Culp 
adopts the position urged by respondent and holds that a title 
insurance company incurs liability only under its contract of 
insurance when it issues a policy of title insurance and does 
not incur liability for abstracter's negligence for any omis-
sions in its statement of the status of the title to the 
property insured. The decision in Culp appears to eliminate 
appellant Combes' claim based upon abstracter's negligence. 
The issue of negligent mispresentation as discussed in 
Culp is not material because it is undisputed in the instant 
case that no preliminary title report was ever issued or 
relied upon. 
Hopefully the above will be of assistance to the court in 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk of Utah Court: of Appeals 
July 11r 1990 
Page -2-
resolving the Issues of this case. 
DEW:bh 
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David E. West 
Attorney for Attorneys 1 
T i 11 e G u a r a n t y Fu r " 
c.c. John P. Ashton 
Erik Strindberg 
Jack L, Schoenhals 
T h e o d o r e E . K a n n e 11 
4 White v. Sla 
•? »37 Utah A 
ction over a case whik u is under advisement 
on appeal 3 Wc have made exceptions to the 
rule in the interest of preventing unnecessary 
delay, where any action by the trial court is 
not likely to modify a party's rights with 
respect to the issues raised on appeal Thus in 
Peters v Peters, 15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P 2d 71 
(1964), we held that the district court, which 
has continuing jurisdiction after entry of a 
final divorce decree, may adjudicate a petition 
to modify the decree due to a change of circ 
umstances while the decree is pending on 
appeal since the petition for modification is 
collateral to the divorce decree Similarly, 
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as 
final a judgment against one party in a multi-
party action, the remainder of the action 
remains in the trial court and is not necessarily 
affected by the appeal In that case, the trial j 
court has jurisdiction* to proceed with the 
claims remaining unadjudicated Lane v 
Messer, 689 P 2d 1333 (Utah 1984) 
In the instant case, defendants seek to 
reduce the judgment against them by amounts 
which they aver have already been paid to 
plaintiff4 An adjudication of the motion, 
though a modification of the judgment may 
result, will not affect the legal issues raised 
here with respect to attorney fees and defen 
dams' liability Under these circumstances, we 
see no need to suspend our jurisdiction while 
the district court has the matter under consi-
deration, as that will only delay proceedings 
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule 
60(b) motion and may deny it without intcrf 
erence from this court If the motion is 
granted, the trial court in this case need only 
advise this court that the judgment has been 
modified The district court action granting or 
denying the motion and the modified judg 
ment should be included in the record when it 
is prepared for review by this court 
Defendants' motion to stay proceedings and 
remand the case to the district court is denied, 
and the district court is directed to hear and 
determine the rule 60(b) motion 
1 Indeed it has been observed that the rule prov 
»dcs a "nice balance between the interest In finality 
(of judgments] and the desire to achieve justice " 
Wright & Miller 11 / edirul Practice and Procedure 
§2872(1973) 
2 Long v Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F 2d 
1310 1318 (9lh Cir 1981) 
3 Sec e g Smith v Kufibull, 76 Utah 350, 289 l» 
588(1930) 
4 Wc of course express no opinion on the merits 
of the motion, that being for the trial court to del 
ermine 
Ce of Utah CODE^CO 
lv. Ken, 3 Provo Unh 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tion appeals from a grant of summary judg-
ment In favor of Lawyers Title Insurance 
Corporation The trial court found that no 
genuine issue of materia) fact existed with 
regard to Tower Federal Savings and Loan 
Association's complaint that Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation owed Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan a duty to disclose all record 
title Information Wc affirm In part and 
reverse in part. 
FACTS 
On appeal from summary judgment, wc 
look at the facts in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing summary judgment.1 
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a Utah 
limited partnership, was established to develop 
and construct, in Salt Lake County, a retail 
shopping mall and warehouse distribution 
I center specializing in custom building mater-
I ials Fundina for the project was essentially 
cooe«co Culp Construction C 
Provo U l > h
 137 Utah 
pment revenue bonds ("lRBs") in the face 
amount of $7,750,000 First Security Bank of 
Utah, N A ("first Security"), acted as inde-
nture trustee on the IRB loan through its 
corporate trust department The deed of trust 
securing the IRB loan was recorded on Sept 
ember 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's office 
During the summer of 1984, the principal of 
the project determined that a funding shortfall 
of approximately $500,000 existed for the 
completion of the project Tower Federal 
Savings and Loan Association ("Tower") was 
approached by a mortgage broker, Richards-
Woodbury Mortgage Corporation ("Richards-
Woodbury"), with respect to lending Build-
mart Mall $750,000, secured by a second 
position deed of trust to the project, in order 
to complete construction 
Richards-Wood bury retained Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to 
provide a commitment for title insurance and 
issue a title insurance policy. Richmond Title 
Company ("Richmond Title"), the local agent 
for Lawyers Title, furnished Richards-
Woodbury with a commitment for title insu-
rance that revealed certain encumbrances and 
hens against the title Richmond Title also 
acted as local agent for Lawyers Title in | 
writing the subsequent title policy 
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K Woodbury, 
acting as agent for Tower, wrote a letter to 
Richmond Title delineating escrow instructions 
for the funds to be loaned by Tower Rich-
mond Title was instructed, among other 
things, to deposit the funds into an escrow 
account and to release the funds to Buildmart 
Mall only when Richmond Title had taken 
steps to "insure that the Trust Deed enclosed 
herewith is in a second lien position behind 
(First Security Bank]" and *[t]he only prior 
exceptions to the Trust Deed should be those 
listed in your Commitment for Title Insur-
ance " In addition, the escrow instructions 
directed Richmond that if it was "unable or 
unwilling to promptly follow all of the above 
referenced instructions," it was to forego dis-
bursement of the funds 
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but after 
the commitment for title insurance ("the 
commitment") had been issued, numerous 
liens appeared of record that were not repo-
rted by Lawyers Title or Richmond Title on 
the commitment Richmond nevertheless dis-
bursed the funds, and the Tower loan was 
secured by a second deed of trust that was 
recorded on March 20, 1985, in the office of 
the Salt Lake County Recorder 
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the devel-
oper defaulted on its loan with Tower, as well 
as its obligations under the IRB loan Culp 
Construction Company ("Culp"), the devel-
oper's primary general contractor, filed a 
>. v. Buildmart Mall 
Jv. 8«?, * 
I. BRFACII OF CONTRACT 
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title 
breached a contractual duty to accurately 
report the status of the title at the time the 
Tower loan was closed The record reveals 
that the only contractual privity Tower had 
I with Lawyers Title was the title insurance 
policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title 
through its local agent, Richmond Title 
The essence ol Tower's claim is that as part 
of the title insurance process, Lawyers Title 
issued a commitment for title insuiance to 
Richards-Wood bury that was not updated 
and upon which Tower relied in making the 
loan Tower claims that certain mechanic's 
liens of record v. ere not included as an update 
to the commitment and that additional hens 
would have indicated a "red flag" that the 
project was underfunded, which would have 
caused Tower to decline advancing any loan 
funds to Buildmart 
Lawyers Title presents three argument* to 
support summar) judgment on the breach of 
contract issue. Its first argument is that the 
only contract it had with Tower was the title 
insurance policy itself and that it fulfilled »U 
requirements of the policy. Second, Lawyers 
Title argues that the commitment for title 
insurance that preceded the title policy was 
issued to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower, 
and therefore no privity existed between 
Lawyers Title and Tower with regard to the 
commitment Third, Lawyers Title argues that 
a commitment or preliminary title report is not 
ered its defense of the litigation to Lawyers 
Title under the terms of the title insurance 
policy Lawyers Title accepted the tender of 
defense subject to a reservation of rights 
First Security initiated nonjudicial foreclo-
sure proceedings against the project as trustee 
under the indenture of trust and, on March 
16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at which First 
Security acquired the project As a result of 
the foreclosure proceedings, all hens junior to 
the first hen held by first Security, including 
the Tower trust deed, were extinguished by 
operation of law Tower and its counsel did 
not take any action to stop the foreclosure sale 
or protect its security interest. 
A settlement was reached between all 
parties, resulting in the dismissal of all claims 
with prejudice, with the exception of the 
claims between Tower and Lawyers Title All 
outstanding mechanic's liens on the project 
were released as part of the settlement 
On appeal from summary judgment in favor 
of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that there are 
genuine issues of material fact with respect to 
three causes of action breach of contract, 
breach of an implied contractual obligation of 
good faith and fair dealing, and negligent 
misrepresentation 
Zo. v. Buildmart Mall CODG*CO 
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any estate or Interest therein, toge-
ther with a statement of all liens, 
charges, or liabilities to which the 
same may be subject, and of which 
is in any way material for purcha-
sers to be apprised. An epitome of 
the record evidence of title, inclu-
ding maps, plats, and other aids.6 
The function, form, and character of a title 
insurer is different from that of an abstractor. 
One who hires a title insurance company docs 
so.for the purpose of obtaining the assurance 
or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in 
the chain of title rather than for the purpose 
of discovering the title status. A title insurance 
company's function is generally confined to 
the practice of insurance, not to the practice 
of abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not 
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of its 
status as a title insurance company. 
Culp Construction C 
w UZJJuh 
h is first to be observed that Lawyers Iitle 
fully and adequately defended Tower's second 
lien position as it was obligated (o do by the 
terms of the title insurance policy. For that 
reason, Tower's cause of action for breach oT 
an implied duty of good faith and fajr dealing 
or the duty to bargain in good faith is unsu-
pported by the facts. Hence, we affirm the 
conclusion of the trial court that no genuine 
issue of material fact exists with respect to 
breach of the contractual duty of good faith 
and fair dealing.* 
As to whether a title insurance company is 
an abstractor of title, some jurisdictions hold 
title insurance companies to .the standard of 
liability generally associated with abstractors.3 
However, we believe that the better-reasoned 
approach is to consider preliminary title 
reports and commitments for title insurance as 
"no more than a statement of the terms and 
conditions upon which the insurer is willing to 
issue its title policy ...."4 Indeed, "{tine prev-
ailing view remains not to impose liability in 
tort on a title company. "5 
Utah Code Ann. §31 A-1-301 (82) (1986 
& Supp. 1989) defines title insurance as 
the insuring, guaranteeing, or ind-
emnifying of owners of real or 
personal property or the holders of 
liens or encumbrances on that pro-
perty, or others interested in the 
property against loss or damage 
suffered by reason of liens or enc-
umbrances upon, delects in, or the 
unmarkctability of the title to the 
property, or invalidity or unenfor-
ceability of any liens or encumbra-
nces on the property. 
It is also to be observed that a duty is 
imposed by statute upon title insurers to make 
a reasonable search and examination of title 
for the purpose of determining insurability. 
Utah Code Ann. §31A-20-110(1) (1986) 
states in part: "No title insurance policy may 
be written until the title insurer or its agent 
has conducted a reasonable search and exam-
ination of the title and has made a determin-
ation of insurability of title under sound 
underwriting principles." Nevertheless, even 
though section 31 A-20-110(1) imposes a 
duty of a reasonable search and examination 
for the purpose of determining the insurability 
of title, it does not impose a duty to abstract 
titles upon title insurance companies. 
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah 
Code; however, "abstract of title" has been 
defined as 
(a) condensed history of the title to 
land, consisting qf a synopsis or 
summary of the material or opera-
tive portion of all, the conveyances. 
II. NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The next claim asserted by Tower is that 
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond 
Title, negligently misrepresented the state of 
the title in the commitment for title insurance. 
The trial court held that because "negligent 
misrepresentation" is a tort claim, it could not 
be asserted separately from the breach of 
contract claim when the alleged misrepresent-
ation arose out of the contractual relationship 
of the parties according to our decision in Beck 
v. Farmers Insurance Exchange.1 
In Deck, an insured brought an action 
against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to 
settle a claim for insured motorist benefits. 
The insured alleged breach of contract, breach 
of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. With regard to the emotional distress 
tort claim, we held that "in a first-party 
relationship between an insurer and its 
insured, the duties and obligations of the 
parties are contractual rather than fiduciary. 
Without more, a breach of those implied or 
express duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort."» However, 
our holding in Beck does not preclude the 
bringing of a tort claim independently of a 
contract claim. In Beck, we specifically stated: 
"We recognize that in some cases the acts 
constituting a breach of contract may also 
result in breaches of duty that are independent 
of the contract and may give rise to causes of 
action in tort."' Statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action under 
various unfair practices acts may also give rise 
to independent tort actions.10 
Negligent misrepresentation occurs *[w]here 
one having a pecuniary interest in a transac-
tion, is in a superior position to know material 
facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a 
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frovo, Utih . 137 UUlt 
suffen loss in that transaction ...." , l Furthe-
rmore, "privity of contract is not a necessary 
prerequisite to liability."12 
In the instant case. Tower asserts a cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation because 
Lawyers Title provided a commitment for title 
insurance to Richards-Woodbury, a mort-
gage broker, with the knowledge that Tower 
would rely upon the commitment in making 
the loan. Genuine issues of material fact exist 
with regard to whether Lawyers Title knew 
that Tower would rely upon the commitment 
in making the loan. Indications of reliance on 
the commitment may arise from the fact that 
the title insurance policy was issued to both 
Richards-Woodbury and Tower. In addition, 
the escrow instructions given to Lawyers 
Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal that the ] 
loan was contingent upon the status of the 
title remaining the same at the time of closing 
as it was when the commitment was provided. 
Lawyers Title argues that because a comm-
itment is not an abstract of title, Tower could 
not reasonably rely upon it as a comprehensive 
statement of the status of the title. We have 
heretofore concluded that the commitment for 
title insurance or a preliminary title report in 
this case was not an abstract of title; however, 
it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent, 
Richmond Title, may have assumed the duties 
and responsibilities of an abstractor when it 
received the escrow instructions from Tower's 
agent which explicitly directed Richmond not 
to transfer the loan funds unless the title 
status remained the same as stated on the 
commitment. 
We hold that summary judgment on the 
issue of negligent misrepresentation was ina-
ppropriate because our decision in Beck docs 
not preclude a separate independent tort. In 
addition, material factual issues remain as to 
whether Lawyers Title owed a contractual duty 
to Tower to represent the true status of the I 
title upon receipt and acceptance of the escrow 
instructions and at all times thereafter when 
Lawyers Title knew, or in the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence should have known, of 
additional mechanic's liens against the subject 
property. Should it be determined that 
Lawyers Title owed Tower a duty of disclo-
sure, other questions of material fact also 
exist, including whether that duty was brea-
ched and whether Tower reasonably relied 
upon the commitment, thereby defeating a 
motion for summary judgment. 
Remanded for further proceedings consis-
tent with this opinion. 
WE CONCUR: 
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice 
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice j 
Judith M. Billings, Court of Appeals Judge | 
>. v. Buildmart Malt 
IKRCP.1_.__ _______ 
Durham, Justice, having disqualified 
herself, docs not participate herein; Hillings, 
Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, and 




STATE OF UTAH, by an (J through ill 
Department of Transportation, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
and 
Staker Paving and Construction Company, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
This opinion li subject to revision before 
publication In the Pacific Reporter. 
STEWART, Justice 
Plaintiff Christensen & Griffith Construe-
on v. State of Utah CODE • CO 
|V, KfD, 8 Pfovo Utah 
judgment dismissing its complaint against 
defendant State of Utah Defendant and 
counterclaimant Staker Paving and Constru 
etion appeals the grant of summary judgment 
entered in favor of the State dismissing 
Staker's counterclaim against the State 
I. FACTS 
Christensen & Griffith contracted with 
Provo City to construct the East Bay Golf 
Course Construction of the golf course began 
in mid-March of 1984 At approximately jhe 
same time, the State began building two dikes 
running parallel to and along both sides of 
Interstate 15 ("1-15"), the major freeway 
running north and south through Provo. To 
the east of 1-15 lies a range of mountains 
Runoff water drains from the mountains and 
flows westward toward Utah Lake, which lies 
to the west of 1-15 
The East Bay Golf Course is located imm-
ediately east of 1-15, between the mountains 
and the freeway. At this location, the roadbed 
on which 1-15 lies acts as a dam or dike, 
stopping the flow of water from the mount-
ains toward the lake. Because of this condi-
tion, several culverts were constructed under-
neath 1-15 to allow water to flow unimpeded 
to Utah Lake 
As part of the State's diking project in 
1984, the culverts under 1-15 had to be ext-
ended to run under the new dikes. To facili-
tate the culvert extension, the State's contra-
ctor, Staker Paving, built coffer dams. These 
coffer dams were mounds of earth built 
around the culverts and the areas into which 
the culverts would be extended The water 
trapped behind the coffer dams was pumped 
out to create a dry area in which the extens 
ions on the ends of the culverts could be built 
However, with the coffer dams in place, the 
water could not flow through the culverts 
toward Utah Lake. 
Christensen & Griffith alleges that the State 
and Staker negligently allowed the coffer dams 
to remain in place after Staker's project was 
completed, thus damming the water and 
causing the water level on the east side of I-
15 to rise. Christensen & Griffith alleges 
further that this caused flooding in the area of 
construction of the golf course. Christensen & 
Onffith complains that this made their work 
much more difficult. The work was slowed 
because of the necessity to work in water, the 
need to use draglines instead of backhoes, and 
the need to move material twice. 
Plaintiffs Provo City and Christensen & 
Griffith originally filed this action on May 13, 
1985 The State filed un answer and cross-
claim against its contractor Staker. Staker 
filed an answer to the original complaint and 
to the State's cross-claim and also filed a 
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Staker based on an argument that the State 
was immune from suit for flood related 
activities under a 1984 amendment to Utah 
Code Ann §63-30-3. The State's motion 
was granted as to both of plaintiffs' claims 
and as to Staker's counterclaim Provo City 
and Christensen & Griffith independently 
appealed the grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the State The appeal of Provo City 
was dismissed after it settled out of court with 
the State Staker also appealed the grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the State 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A grant of summary judgment is appropr-
iate only where there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law Utah R. Civ 
P. 56(c); Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt 
Paving, Inc v Blomquist, 773 P 2d 1382, 
1385 (Utah 1989) When we review a trial 
court's grant of summary judgment, we 
analyze the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Copper 
State Leasing Co v Blacker Appliance & 
Furniture Co , 770 P 2d 88, 89 (Utah 1988) 
We review the trial court's conclusions of law 
for correctness Madsen v Borthick, 769 P 2d 
245, 247 (Utah 1988) 
III ANALYSIS 
A. Statute 
Utah Code Ann §63-30-3 (1989) prov- i 
ides as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter, all governm-
ental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from 
the exercise of a governmental tunc 
tion, g o v e r n m e n t a l l y - o w n e d 
hospital, nursing home, or other 
governmental health care facility, 
and from an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional 
health care clinical training program 
conducted in cither public or private 
facilities 
The management of flood waters 
and other natural disasters and the | 
construction, repair, and operation 
of flood and storm systems by 
governmental entities are considered 
to be governmental functions, and 
governmental entities and their 
officers are immune from suit for 
any injury or damage resulting from 
those activities 
(Emphasis added ) The State argues that the 
immunity granted for flood control manage-
ment is absolute and not subject to the waivers 
of immunity provided in sections 63-30-5 
through 63-30-10 5 of the Governmental 
immunity *) Christensen & Griffith argues that 
the second paragraph should be read to 
provide only a qualified immunity for flood 
control activities, which would make the 
immunity subject to the waiver provisions 
(This argument is hereinafter referred to as the 
argument for "qualified immunity ") The 
central issue in this case is the choice between 
these two positions 
B / egislative History 
The amendment adding the second parag-
I raph to §63-30 3 was enacted in 1984 as 
part of Senate Bill No. 97, entitled "Flood 
Relief-1984 " 1984 Utah Laws ch 33. §1 
This governmental immunity amendment was 
only a small part of a larger act which prov-
ided for various actions by different state 
agencies to respond to recent flooding and 
expected flooding Senator Finlinson, the 
Senate sponsor of the bill, discussed the 
purpose of the amendment to §63-30-3 on 
the Senate floor. 
And what we're really trying to do 
is encourage the public sector to 
take action to prevent damage Salt 
Lake City is probably one of the, 
and the Salt Lake County program 
with the trerriendous effort they did 
through their f lood control 
program It did cost money but 
they saved, you know, millions of 
dollars worth of damage to the 
private sector and we want them to 
be able to make good decisions 
relative to flood control without 
worrying about somebody coming 
back and suing [them] less [sic] and 
second guessing [them] m that very 
situation 
1984 Senate Bill No 97, Day 20 (Saturday, 
January 28, 1984, afternoon session) 
(emphasis added) This statement indicates 
that in enacting this amendment, the legisla-
ture intended to encourage governmental ent-
ities to take action to prevent damage from 
expected flooding 
Senator Fmlinson's statement is consistent 
with either an absolute or a qualified immu-
nity interpretation of §63-30-3 The stat-
ement is consistent with the qualified immu-
nity interpretation because Senator Finlinson 
stated that the legislature wanted public sector 
decision-makers to be able to make decisions 
relating to flood control without worrying 
about someone "second guessing" them This 
purpose is met by classifying flood control 
activities as "governmental functions " If 
flood control is classified as a "governmental 
function," a governmental entity would be 
liable for ordinary negligence committed in 
flood control activities, but would not neces-
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